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Abstract
Consider a single-server first-come-first-served M/G/1 queue with
the exception that service demand distribution is determined endoge-
nously by the following mechanism: Each customer who enters into
the service position faces a dynamic decision of when to terminate her
service period and then to leave the system for good. In addition, all
customers have random linear costs in their waiting times (not includ-
ing service times) and each of them continuously observes the evolution
of her marginal utility from service duration. It is assumed that the
marginal utilities of the customers are general iid nonincreasing, right-
continuous stochastic processes which are independent from the arrival
process. Now, customers are acting according to their own self-interest
and hence there is an overuse of the server. To overcome this ineffi-
ciency, this work includes an efficient method to compute a price func-
tion which implements a socially optimal resource allocation. Then,
some examples of nonincreasing, right-continuous stochastic processes
are considered. In addition, it is shown that this price function inter-
nalizes the externalities created by customers. Finally, similar results
are derived for M/G/1 retrial queue. In particular, there is a conjec-
ture regarding the expression for the expected externalities in such a
retrial queueing system.
Keywords: M/G/1 queue. Stochastic utility. Congestion control. Exter-
nalities.
AMS Subject Classification (MSC2010): 60K25, 90B22, 90C15.
∗Department of statistics and data science; The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;
Jerusalem 9190501; Israel. royi.jacobovic@mail.huji.ac.il
1
1 Introduction
Consider a single-server queue with a Poisson stream of customers such that
there are no abandonments and all customers must join the queue. The ser-
vice discipline is non-preemptive and work-conserving (for exact definitions
see e.g., Section 1 of [20]). In addition, any customer who enters the service
position faces a dynamic decision of when to terminate her service period
and then to leave the system for good. Examples for some daily situations in
which customers dynamically decide when to terminate their service periods
are e.g., clients in a coffee-shop, drivers parking their cars in a garage, peo-
ple using a public toilet and etc. More examples are provided in Section 1
of [12]. In the current model the customers decisions are influenced by three
factors: (1) Every customer has a (random) linear costs in her waiting times
(not including service times). (2) Their marginal utilities are general iid
nonincreasing1 right-continuous stochastic processes which are independent
from the arrival process. (3) There is a deterministic price function which
states a payment for every service duration. In addition, each customer con-
tinuously observes the evolution of hers marginal utility over time from the
moment she enters into the service position and until she quits. Importantly,
since there is no an option that a customer effects her own waiting time by
doing some action, then for every customer, the individual optimization is
totally focused on the question of when to quit the service position? This
is an optimal-stopping problem with respect to the natural filtration which
is associated with the customer’s marginal utility process. Thus, since the
marginal utilities of the customers constitute an iid sequence of processes
which is independent from the arrival process, so is the sequence of the re-
sulting service demands. i.e., eventually this model is all about a regular
M/G/1 queue with a service distribution which is determined endogenously
by the above-mentioned mechanism and especially by the choice of a price
function.
This setup motivates the following question: Is it possible to choose a
price function for which the performance of the system is optimized from a
social point of view? This work includes an analysis with a positive answer
to this question when the performance measure is the expected social welfare
which is associated with the sojourn of a random customer in the steady-
state of the resultingM/G/1 queue (this will be formalized in Section 2). In
particular, a contribution of this work is an efficient numerical procedure to
compute a price function which implies an optimal resource allocation with
1This assumption is consistent with Gossen’s first law of diminishing marginal utility.
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respect to this criterion.
Importantly, in this paper the assumption is that the price function is
a deterministic function of the service duration. Note that such a price
function is not optimal among all pricing rules since it ignores all aspects
of the system except service duration. For example, it is better to imple-
ment a price function which allows a customer to get service for free once
there are no waiting customers. However, as mentioned by [20], there are
some arguments for a price function which is uniquely determined by service
duration:
1. In some occasions monitoring the queue length is not possible due
to technical reasons. Also, it is possible that such monitoring is too
expensive.
2. It might be a bit unfair to require different payments from customers
having the same service duration. For instance, a customer may refuse
to pay large amounts of money due to a batch of arrivals happened
just after she had started receiving service claiming that it is not her
fault.
The rest of this work is organized as follows: Section 2 includes the model
description. Section 3 contains an explanation about how a socially opti-
mal price function can be derived efficiently by using a two-phase method.
Section 4 is about some applications of the results of Section 3 to special
cases of nonincreasing right-continuous stochastic processes. Section 5 be-
gins with a brief review regarding the notion of externalities in the sense
of [20]. Then, the main result of this section is about the relation between
the price function described in Section 3 and this notion. Section 6 includes
a model description of a similar queue with customers retrials. Then, it is
shown that analogue results to those appeared in Sections 3 and 5 can be
derived for this retrial version of the original model. In particular, these
results lead to a conjecture regarding an expression for the expected exter-
nalities in the corresponding M/G/1 retrial queue. Finally, Section 7 is a
discussion about how the results of the previous sections can be applied for
a similar model with customers who may refuse joining the queue.
1.1 Related literature
In general, this work is about a regulation of a system with shared resources
by an implementation of a price function. The fact that systems with shared
resources may become inefficient due to individualism is notably mentioned
3
by [16] which was later reviewed by e.g., [9] and [31]. One sort of remedy
for this problem is a taxation (a.k.a Pigouvian tax) by a price function. For
some more details in an introductory level from the point of view of social
welfare theory, see e.g., Chapter 11 of [26]. In addition, some papers about
regulation of economic systems by a Pigouvian taxation are e.g., [3, 5, 7].
In game theory this problem is closely related to the genre of cost allocation
problems (see e.g., [34]). In particular, one kind of solutions suggested in
this literature is based on Shapley value. For more information about this
notion see [30] and for some applications of this notion to queueing systems
see e.g., [19, 21].
In queueing literature, the issue of regulation of an observable queue
goes back to [25] and [27] while regulation of an unobservable queue was
primarily discussed by [10]. These papers initiated an academic discussion
about decision-making and regulation of queueing systems which is surveyed
by [18] and more recently by [17]. One branch of this literature is about
models with customers of different types having heterogeneous preferences.
For references of such models see e.g., Subsections 2.5, 3.3, 3.4 of [18]. Now,
the stochastic framework of the current model is flexible enough to model
such customers. To see this, observe that the distribution of the stochastic
marginal utility process of every customer can be determined as a function
of a random variable representing her type. Importantly, the results of this
work are valid for every type distribution and not just for a continuous or
discrete one which is a standard assumption in this literature.
In addition, this work is about a model in which customers are those who
decide on their service durations (unlike expert systems in which servers
decide how long to serve each customer). For works in this direction see
Subsection 4.7 of [17]. Two recent works which are not mentioned in this
survey are [12, 28].2 [28] has extended the framework of [32] in the following
way: Assume a model with customers of continuously distributed types
who arrive into an unobservable single-server queue according to a Poisson
arrival process. The type of each customer is her private information. In
addition, the customers have a quasi-linear utility functions (parametrized
by their types) over the set of bundles of service and waiting times. Now,
customers have two decisions to make. First, they have to decide whether
to join or not to join the queue. Secondly, once they join the queue, they
have to decide how much service to require. Then, the author analyses two
regulation schemes: (1) Per-use fees and (2) price-rate. A similar model
2[28] is a work which was presented in The 20th INFORMS Applied Probability Society
Conference, July 3-5, 2019, Brisbane Australia.
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with a different setup has been recently suggested by [12]. In their work,
the authors put the focus on comparison between three schemes to control
congestion in the service facility: (1) Per-use fees, (2) constant price-rates
and (3) time-limits. In their work the authors use a very specific utility
function which is parametrized by the customer type and not necessarily
concave in service duration. In addition, an important aspect of this work
is a consideration of different regulation objectives, namely maximization of
consumer surplus versus firms gains.
Now, the current work shares some guidelines with this existing litera-
ture, albeit there are some differences:
1. In the current work customers must join the queue (note that the
discussion in Section 7 is an exception).
2. In the current work, given the type of a customer, the utility of this
customer from service is a stochastic concave function.
3. In the current work the optimization is performed over a quite general
space of price functions which includes several kinds of price functions
analyzed separately in the existing literature.
4. The current work includes a retrial version of the model.
5. The current work provides a general methodology to compute an op-
timal price function.
6. In the current work the loss rate from waiting time is modeled as a ran-
dom variable which varies among customers (note that the discussion
in Section 7 is an exception).
Another contribution of the current work is modeling the marginal utilities
of customers in queueing systems by stochastic processes. While, to the best
of author’s knowledge, it is a new modeling concept for decision-making in
queueing systems, it is not new in economics discipline (see e.g., [15]). Of-
course, this makes the current work also related to stochastic utility models
(see e.g., [13]). Another aspect of this work which appears in Section 4 is
using Le´vy processes to model the marginal marginal utilities of the cus-
tomers. For other applications of Le´vy processes in storage systems, mostly
as inputs processes of various storage systems, see e.g., [8]. Similarly, there
is also an application of Markov-modulated fluid flow (MMFF) to model the
marginal utilities of the customers. This process has many application to
stochastic systems. For a recent introduction to this topic including refer-
ences of some application see e.g., [24]. Finally, Subsection 4.2.1 is closely
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related to the problem of the first crossing of a Poisson process by a de-
creasing linear boundary. This problem is discussed in Subsection 3.2 of
[35].
2 Model description
The following paragraph includes some notations to be used later on. For
every (a, b) ∈ R2 let a∧ b ≡ min{a, b}, a+ ≡ max{a, 0} and a− ≡ (−a)+. In
addition, (Ω,F , P ) is the probability space which is in the background of this
model. In addition, X ∈ F means that X is F-measurable. Furthermore,
for every X ∈ F , once exists, EX is the expectation of X with respect to
(w.r.t) P . Finally, for simplicity, if there is an equality (inequality) which
involves random variables without further description, then the meaning is
for a pointwise equality (inequality).
Assume that customers arrive into a service facility with a single server
and a waiting room with an infinite capacity according to a Poisson process
with rate λ ∈ (0,∞). In addition, the service discipline is non-preemptive
and work-conserving such that when a customer enters into a service posi-
tion, she receives service which lasts until she decides to stop and then she
leaves the system for good. To model the preferences of the customers, let
(X(·), C) , (X1(·), C1) , (X2(·), C2) , . . . (1)
be an iid sequence of random objects which is independent from the ar-
rival process. In particular, C is a nonnegative random variable with mean
γ ∈ (0,∞) and {X(s); s ≥ 0} is a nonincreasing right-continuous stochastic
process for which X(0) is a nonnegative square-integrable random variable.
For every i ≥ 1, the total utility of the i’th customer from waiting w ≥ 0
minutes (not including service time) and receiving a service of s ≥ 0 minutes
equals to
Ui (s,w; p) ≡
∫ s
0
Xi(t)dt− p(s)− Ciw (2)
where p : [0,∞]→ [−∞,∞] is a general (deterministic) Bore´l function. This
means that the i’th customer suffers a linear loss from waiting time with rate
Ci and has a stochastic marginal utility from service duration which is given
by Xi(·). In addition, for every s ∈ [0,∞], p(s) is a deterministic payment
which has to be paid by a customer for occupying the server for s minutes
and notice that conceptually negative as well as infinite payments are also
allowed. On the other hand, let ξ(·) be a nondecreasing right-continuous
deterministic nonnegative function such that ξ(0) = 0 which models the
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server’s marginal loss from service. In particular, notice that it is possible
to have ξ(·) which equals to a nonnegative constant. This means that the
server revenue from providing service of s ≥ 0 minutes for one customer (no
matter who) is
R(s; p) ≡ p(s)−
∫ s
0
ξ(t)dt . (3)
In addition, an assumption is that the server marginal revenue from being
idle is identically zero. Therefore, by a summation of (2) and (3), the social
welfare which is gained by the sojourn of the i’th customer in the system
with waiting w ≥ 0 minutes and getting service of s ≥ 0 minutes is
SWi(s,w; p) ≡
∫ s
0
Vi(t)dt− Ciw (4)
such that Vi(s) ≡ [Xi − ξ] (s),∀s ≥ 0. In addition, for simplicity of nota-
tion let V (s) ≡ [X − ξ] (s),∀s ≥ 0 and notice that V (·) is a nonincreasing
right-continuous stochastic process such that V (0) = X(0) is a nonnegative
square-integrable random variable.
Importantly, since customers must join the queue and can’t abandon it,
there is no strategic interaction between them and there is no customer who
can influence her own waiting time by any active operation. Now, the next
step is to analyze the decision-making of the customers. To this end, the
assumption is that for every i, the i’th customer is familiar with the price
function p(·) and the statistical assumptions of the model. In addition, she
observes the evolution of Xi(·) from the moment she enters into a service
position and until she leaves the system. Thus, if FXi is the natural filtration
which is associated with Xi(·), her objective is to solve the next optimal-
stopping problem which, conceptually, without further assumptions might
not have a solution
max
S
: w(S) ≡ E
[∫ S
0
Xi(s)ds − p(S)
]
s.t: S is a stopping time w.r.t FXi .
(5)
In addition, consider an extra assumption regarding the individual choice
of the customers: If S′ and S′′ are two stopping times such that w (S′) =
w (S′′), S′ ≤ S′′, P -a.s. and P (S′ < S′′) > 0, then all customers consider
S′ as better than S′′. In particular, notice that w(·) is not indexed by i
because X1(·),X2(·), . . . is an iid sequence of processes. Moreover, observe
that once (5) has a solution, Si, since X1(·),X2(·), . . . is an iid sequence of
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processes which is independent from the arrival process, then so is the cor-
responding sequence of stopping times S1, S2, . . .. Thus, the resulting queue
is a standard M/G/1 queue with a service distribution which is determined
endogenously by the choice of a price function p(·) through the mechanism
of the individual optimization posted by (5).
Now, this observation motivates the question whether it is possible to
choose p(·) for which the performance of the resulting M/G/1 queue is
optimal from a social point of view? More precisely, in this work the purpose
is to find a price function for which
1. There exists a solution for (5) (otherwise p(·) is not a good manipulator
of individual behaviour).
2. The resulting M/G/1 queue is stable (otherwise the system is over-
flowed in the long-run).
3. The expected social welfare which is gained by a sojourn of a random
customer in the steady-state of the resulting M/G/1 queue is maxi-
mized over the set of all price functions for which both criteria 1 and
2 are satisfied.
For this problem there is a solution whose details are provided in Section
3. To see the guiding strategy which is in its background, recall that 3 is
an optimization over a domain of price functions satisfying both criteria 1
and 2. Clearly, every price function in the optimization domain implies a
resulting stableM/G/1 system whose service distribution is a consequence of
the choice of a price function. Therefore, instead of solving the optimization
directly, the following two-stage approach is suggested:
Stage 1: The task is to find a service distribution for which the social wel-
fare which is gained by a sojourn of a random customer in the steady-
state of the resulting M/G/1 queue is maximized over the set of all
service distributions for which the system is stable. Notice that this
stage involves an optimization of the corresponding functional over a
domian of service distributions.
Stage 2: The task is to perform a reverse-engineering of a price function
for which the individual optimization has a unique solution which is
distributed like the solution derived in Stage 1.
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3 Optimal price function
Using a well-known result regarding the expectation of the stationary virtual
waiting time of M/G/1 system, a naive statement of the optimization over
service distributions in Stage 1 is given by:
max
S∈F
: E
∫ S
0
V (s)ds− γ λES
2
2 (1− λES)
s.t: 0 ≤ S , P -a.s. ,
ES < λ−1 .
(6)
The problem with this formulation is as follows: It is possible to have S ∈ F
which belongs to the optimization domain for which ES2 = E
∫ S
0 V (s)ds =
∞, i.e., it is possible that the objective functional is not well-defined for
every point in the optimization domain. To solve this technical problem,
consider the next reformulation of (6) by:
max
S∈F
: E
∫ S
0
[
V (s)− s γλ
1− λES
]
ds
s.t: 0 ≤ S , P -a.s. ,
ES < λ−1 .
(7)
Later, in Remark 6, an alternative reformulation of (6) is suggested. Now,
for simplicity of notations, denote the objective functional and the opti-
mization domain of (7) respectively by f(·) and S. Then, observe that
EV 2(0) <∞ implies that
E
∫ ∞
0
[ V (s)− sγλ]+ ds ≤ E
∫ ∞
0
[V (0)− sγλ]+ ds <∞ (8)
and hence
E
∫ ∞
0
[
V (s)− s γλ
1− λα
]+
ds <∞ , ∀α ∈ [0, λ−1) (9)
which means that the objective functional f(·) is well-defined on S. In
order to solve (7), consider the following two-phase method whose phases
are explained in the next subsections.
3.1 Phase I:
For every α ∈ [0, λ−1) and x ∈ [−∞,∞] define
Sα(x) ≡ inf
{
s ≥ 0;V (s)− s γλ
1− λα ≤ x
}
. (10)
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Now, for a given α ∈ [0, λ−1), consider (7) with an additional constraint
ES = α, i.e.,
max
S∈F
: E
∫ S
0
[
V (s)− s γλ
1− λα
]
ds
s.t: 0 ≤ S , P -a.s. ,
ES = α .
(11)
If α = 0, then it is straightforward that S0(∞) = 0 and hence it is a
solution of Phase I with α = 0. Now, assume that α ∈ (0, λ−1) and observe
that V (s)− s γλ1−λα is (strictly) decreasing w.r.t s. In addition, since V (·) is
nonincreasing, then for every x ∈ R
0 ≤ Sα(x) ≤ V (0) + |x|
γλ
. (12)
It is given that EV 2(0) < ∞ which implies that EV (0) < ∞ and hence
ESα(x) <∞ for every x ∈ R. Thus, by Theorem 1 of [22] (see also the last
paragraph before Proposition 1 of the same reference) there exists xα ∈ R
for which Sα ≡ Sα(xα) is a solution of (11).
As to be demonstrated in Section 4, the following Remarks 1 and 2 are
important in order to develop an efficient numerical procedure to derive the
optimal price function.
Remark 1 Observe that Sα(x) is nonincreasing with respect to both α and
x on
[
0, λ−1
) × R. In addition, ESα(xα) = α for every α ∈ [0, λ−1) and
hence xα is also nonincreasing w.r.t α. Since x0 = ∞ ≥ 0, this implies
that
{
α ∈ [0, λ−1) ;xα ≥ 0} is not an empty set and hence it is an interval
starting from zero and having right end-point
α′ ≡ sup{α ∈ [0, λ−1) ;xα ≥ 0} ≤ λ−1 . (13)
In addition, note that ESα(0) is nonincreasing function of α and hence α
′
can be derived by a bisection method on
[
0, λ−1
)
.
Remark 2 When V (0) is P -a.s. bounded from above by a positive constant
κ, then for every α ∈ [0, λ−1), xα ≤ κ. Therefore, since ESα(x) is a
monotone function of x, then for every α for which it is known that xα ≥ 0,
then xα can be derived by a bisection method on [0, κ].
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3.2 Phase II:
For every α ∈ [0, λ−1), define
g(α) ≡ f(Sα) = E
∫ Sα
0
[
V (s)− γλ
1− λαs
]
ds (14)
which is the value of the objective functional after phase I with ES = α
constraint. The main results regarding maximization of g(·) on [0, λ−1) are
given in Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Theorem 1. These results follow
by the next lemmata.
Lemma 1 Assume that α ∈ [0, λ−1) such that xα < 0. Then, there exists
α˜ ∈ [0, λ−1) such that xα˜ ≥ 0 and g (α) ≤ g (α˜).
Proof: Let α be such that xα < 0 and define
S˜ ≡ inf
{
s ≥ 0;V (s)− γλ
1− λαs ≤ 0
}
. (15)
Now, notice that S˜ ≤ Sα so α˜ ≡ ES˜ ≤ α. This implies that
g (α˜) ≥ f
(
S˜
)
(16)
= E
∫ S˜
0
[
V (s)− γλ
1− λα˜s
]
ds
≥ E
∫ S˜
0
[
V (s)− γλ
1− λαs
]
ds
≥ E
∫ Sα
0
[
V (s)− γλ
1− λαs
]
ds = g (α) .
Finally, notice that since α˜ ≤ α, α˜ = ES˜ = ESα˜ and
Sα˜ = inf
{
s ≥ 0;V (s)− γλ
1− λα˜s ≤ xα˜
}
(17)
then the same argument which was done in Remark 1 implies that xα˜ is
nonnegative and the result follows.
Lemma 2 Consider some α ∈ [0, λ−1).
1. If xα ≥ 0, then, 0 ≤ Sα ≤ V (0)γλ , and g(α) ≥ 0.
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2. For every α ∈ [0, λ−1)
g (α) ≤ EV
2(0)
γλ
<∞ . (18)
Proof: Let α ∈ [0, λ−1) such that xα ≥ 0 and notice that
Sα = inf
{
s ≥ 0;V (s)− λγ
1− λαs ≤ xα
}
(19)
≤ inf {s ≥ 0;V (s)− λγs ≤ 0} . (20)
Therefore, since V (·) is nonincreasing, deduce that
0 ≤ Sα ≤ V (0)
γλ
(21)
and hence
g (α) = E
∫ Sα
0
[
V (s)− γλ
1− λαs
]
ds (22)
≤ EV (0)Sα ≤ EV
2(0)
γλ
<∞ .
Then, use Lemma 1 in order to show that this upper bound holds for every
α ∈ [0, λ−1). Finally, to show that g(α) ≥ 0 for every α for which xα ≥ 0
observe that in such a case, g(α) is defined as an expectation of an integral
with an integrand which is nonnegative on the integration domain.
Lemma 3 For every α ∈ [0, λ−1), Sα has a finite second moment.
Proof: Let α ∈ [0, λ−1). If xα ≥ 0, then the result is a consequence of
Lemma 2 and hence it is left to consider the case when xα ∈ (−∞, 0). To
this end, define V˜ (s) = V (s)− xα,∀s ≥ 0 and observe that for every S ∈ S
such that ES = α,
E
∫ S
0
[
V˜ (s)− γλ
1− λαs
]
ds = −αxα + f (S) .
This means that Sα is also a solution of
max
S∈F
: E
∫ S
0
[
V˜ (s)− s γλ
1− λα
]
ds
s.t: 0 ≤ S , P -a.s. ,
ES = α .
(23)
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In addition, note that V˜ (·) is right-continuous, nonincreasing process such
that V˜ (0) = V (0) − xα is a square-integrable positive random variable.
Consequently, the result follows by Lemma 2, since by definition
Sα = inf
{
s ≥ 0; V˜ (s)− γλ
1− λαs ≤ 0
}
. (24)
Recall that for every S ∈ S such that ES2 <∞,
f(S) = E
∫ S
0
V (s)ds− γ λES
2
2 (1− λES) . (25)
This identity is useful in order to prove the next Lemma.
Lemma 4 g(·) is concave on [0, λ−1).
Proof: Define
D ≡
{
S ∈ S; ES2 <∞
}
× [0, λ−1) (26)
and for every (S, α) ∈ D denote
h(S, α) ≡
∫ S
0
V (s)ds − γ λS
2
2 (1− λα) . (27)
In particular, observe that V (·) is nonincreasing and hence s 7→ ∫ s0 V (t)dt
is concave on D. Therefore, since (t, s) 7→ t2
s
is convex on R × (0,∞), then
h(S, α) is concave on D. Thus, since an expectation is a linear operator,
then for every (S, α) ∈ D define
H(S, α) ≡ Eh(S, α) = E
∫ S
0
V (s)ds − γ λES
2
2 (1− λα) (28)
which is a concave functional on D. Especially, notice that S is square-
integrable random variable and hence (25) was used in order to justify this
equality. Now, by Lemma 3, infer that
g(α) = sup
{
H(S, α);S ∈ S , ES2 <∞ , ES = α
}
. (29)
and hence the result follows because g(·) equals to a supremum of a concave
functional on a convex set which is not empty (take e.g., (α,α)).
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Lemma 5 limα↓0 g(α) = g(0) = 0.
Proof: Denote
S0 ≡ inf {s ≥ 0;V (s) ≤ 0} (30)
and α0 ≡ E
(
S0 ∧ 12λ
)
. Now, observe that positiveness of S0 implies that
α0 ∈
(
0, 12λ
]
. Then, for every α ∈ [0, α0), define Sˆα ≡ αα0
(
S0 ∧ 12λ
)
which
is square-integrable nonnegative random variable such that ESˆα = α and
hence
g(α) ≥ E
∫ Sˆα
0
V (s)ds − α
2γλ
2α20 (1− λα)
E
(
S0 ∧ 1
2λ
)2
. (31)
Now, the expectation in the second term is finite and hence this term tends
to zero as α ↓ 0. In addition, for every α ∈ [0, α0),
0 ≤
∫ Sˆα
0
V (s)ds ≤
∫ S0∧ 1
2λ
0
V (0)ds ≤ V (0)
2λ
Thus, since EV (0) <∞, dominated convergence implies that the first term
in (31) tends to zero as α ↓ 0. To provide an upper bound which tends to
zero note that for every α ∈ [0, λ−1)
g(α) = E
∫ Sα
0
[
V (s)− s γλ
1− λα
]
ds (32)
≤ E
∫ Sα
0
[V (s)− sγλ] ds
≤ E
∫ S˜α
0
[V (s)− sγλ] ds
where S˜α is the solution of
max
S∈F
: E
∫ S
0
[V (s)− sγλ] ds
s.t: 0 ≤ S , P -a.s. ,
ES = α
(33)
which is specified by Theorem 1 of [22]. In particular, notice that this
optimization is well-defined due to (8). In addition, note that existence of
this solution is justified by the same kind of argument which was provided
in order to justify that Sα is a solution of (11). Now, let
S˜ ≡ inf {s ≥ 0; V (s)− sγλ ≤ 0} (34)
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and notice that
E
∫ S˜
0
[ V (s)− sγλ]− ds = 0 <∞ . (35)
Therefore, the pre-conditions of Proposition 1 of [22] are satisfied, i.e.,
∃ lim
α↓0
E
∫ S˜α
0
[V (s)− sγλ] ds = 0 (36)
and the proof is completed.
Proposition 1 For every ǫ > 0, (7) has an ǫ-optimal solution.
Proof: By Lemma 2, g(·) is uniformly bounded on [0, λ−1) and hence the
result follows.
Proposition 2 If EV (0)
γ
< 1, then (7) has an optimal solution which be-
longs to
[
0, EV (0)
γλ
]
.
Proof: Due to Lemma 2, when EV (0)
γ
≤ 1, then the optimization domain of
Phase II can be reduced to a closed interval
[
0, EV (0)
γλ
]
⊆ [0, λ−1). Therefore,
since Lemmata 4 and 5 imply that g(·) is continuous on [0, λ−1) deduce that
in such circumstances (7) has an optimal solution.
Remark 3 Note that since g(·) is continuous and concave on [0, λ−1), then
standard line-search methods can be applied in order to derive an optimal
solution (or an ǫ-optimal solution when an optimal solution doesn’t exist)
for Phase II. This observation with Remarks 1 and 2 imply that when V (0)
is bounded, then an optimal solution (or ǫ-optimal solution when there is no
optimal solution) for (7) can be derived efficiently. This point is illustrated
by several examples in Section 4.
The following theorem presents a characterization of an optimal solution
of (7) and the corresponding price function. Notice that it requires an
assumption that (7) has an optimal solution. However, if (7) doesn’t have
an optimal solution, then still the result of the following Theorem 1 can be
rephrased for an ǫ-optimal solution of (7) and a corresponding ǫ-optimal
price function.
Theorem 1 Assume that (7) has an optimal solution. Then,
15
1. There exists α∗ ∈
[
0, EV (0)
γλ
]
∩[0, λ−1) such that S∗ ≡ Sα∗ is an optimal
solution of (7) which is square-integrable.
2. For every constant π, an optimal price function is given by
p∗(s;π) ≡ π + sxα∗ + s2 γλ
2 (1− λα∗) +
∫ s
0
ξ(t)dt , ∀s ≥ 0 . (37)
Proof: 1 stems directly from the lemmata which appear in this section. To
show 2, let i ≥ 1 and notice that when p∗(·;π) is implemented, then the
marginal price from service is given by
Mp∗(s;π) ≡ xα∗ + γλ
1− λα∗ s+ ξ(s) , ∀s > 0
which is nondecreasing right-continuous function of s. Thus, since Xi(·) is
nonincreasing and right-continuous, then the resulting individual optimiza-
tion is to stop service at the first moment when the marginal utility is not
greater than the marginal price. This means that the duration of the service
of the i’th customer equals to
inf
{
s ≥ 0;Xi(s) ≤Mp∗(s;π)
}
= inf
{
s ≥ 0;Vi(s)− γλ
1− λα∗ s ≤ xα∗
}
≡ S∗i
which is a stopping time with respect to FXi . In addition, since V (·) and
Vi(·) are equally distributed then so are S∗ and S∗i and the result follows.
Remark 4 Note that xα∗ ≥ 0 and hence when π = 0 then, the optimal price
function p∗(·) ≡ p∗(·; 0) which is specified by Theorem 1 is a nonnegative
increasing function such that p(0) = 0.
Remark 5 Note that computation of the optimal price function which is
suggested in Theorem 1 is all about a computation of α∗ and xα∗ . This
can be done using previous results of this section. For illustration purposes,
some examples are considered in Section 4.
Remark 6 Recall that (7) is a rephrased version of (6) which was in-
troduced in order to solve a technical problem happening when ES2 =
E
∫ S
0 V (s)ds = ∞. An alternative solution for this technical problem is to
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assume that the social planner’s problem is given by
max
S∈F
: E
∫ S
0
V (s)ds− γ λES
2
2 (1− λES)
s.t: 0 ≤ S , P -a.s. ,
ES < λ−1 ,
ES2 <∞ .
(38)
Namely, this problem is like (6) with an additional constraint ES2 < ∞.
Note that the interpretation of this additional constraint is a requirement for
a finite expected waiting time of a random customer in the steady-state of
the resulting M/G/1 queue. Now, by Lemma 3 the optimal solution which
is specified by Theorem 1 is square-integrable. Therefore, one can deduce
that S∗ which is defined in Theorem 1 is an optimal solution of (38).
Remark 7 Observe that by same logic of the proof of Theorem 1, it can
be shown that for every α ∈ [0, λ−1) and x ∈ R, then
pα,x(s) ≡ sx+ s2 γλ
2 (1− λα) +
∫ s
0
ξ(s)ds , ∀s ≥ 0 (39)
is a price function for which there is a unique solution for the individual
optimization which is distributed like Sα(x).
Remark 8 Recall the last paragraph in page 4 of [22]. With this paragraph
in mind, deduce that once (Ω,F , P ) is complete, then the results of this sec-
tion are still valid even with a weaker assumption that V (·) is nonincreasing
and right-continuous P -a.s. As to be shown, this observation is also true for
the results of the upcoming sections.
4 Examples
4.1 A linear function with a random intercept
Let Θ be a nonnegative random variable with mean µ which is bounded
from above by a constant κ ∈ (0,∞) and assume that V (s) = Θ − s for
every s ≥ 0. In addition, for every α ∈ [0, λ−1) denote ψ(α) ≡ 1 + γλ1−λα .
Fix α ∈ [0, λ−1) and x ∈ R, notice that given the event {Θ > x}
Sα(x) =
Θ− x
ψ(α)
(40)
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and hence
ESα(x) = ESα(x)1(x,∞)(Θ) =
EΘ1(x,∞)(Θ)− xP (Θ > x)
ψ(α)
. (41)
Especially, this identity is valid for x = 0 and hence, as explained in Re-
mark 1, it is possible to use a bisection procedure in order to derive α′.
Importantly, in practice one gets an approximation from below of α′ which
is smaller than λ−1. Furthermore, since V (0) = Θ is bounded by κ, then
given some α ∈ [0, α′]∩ [0, λ−1), it is possible to compute xα by a bisection
method on [0, κ] (see Remark 2) using (41). Now, after explaining how to
compute xα for every α ∈ [0, α′] ∩
[
0, λ−1
)
, the next step is to show how to
compute g(α). To this end, notice that
g(α) = E
∫ Sα
0
[Θ− ψ(α)s] ds (42)
= E
∫ Sα
0
(Θ− ψ(α)s) ds1(xα,∞)(Θ)
= EΘSα1(xα,∞)(Θ)−
ψ(α)
2
ES2α1(xα,∞)(Θ) . (43)
Thus, by (40) with an insertion of x = xα, deduce that
EΘSα1(x,∞)(Θ) =
EΘ(Θ− x) 1(xα,∞)(Θ)
ψ(α)
(44)
and
ES2α1(x,∞)(Θ) =
E (Θ− x)2 1(xα,∞)(Θ)
ψ2(α)
. (45)
Finally, a line search procedure can be performed on the interval ∈ [0, α′] ∩[
0, λ−1
)
in order to derive α∗ which corresponds to (at least) an ǫ-optimal
solution (see Remark 3).
4.2 A positive constant minus a subordinator
Let F be some filtration of F which is augmented and right-continuous.
Then, assume that {J(s); s ≥ 0} is a subordinator, i.e., a nondecreasing
process with stationary and independent increments with respect to F such
that J(0) = 0, P -a.s. It is known that Ee−J(s)τ = e−η(τ)s for every τ, s ≥ 0
where
η(τ) ≡ cτ +
∫
(0,∞)
(
1− e−τy) ν(dy) , ∀τ ≥ 0 , (46)
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c ≥ 0 and ν is the associated Le´vy measure which satisfies∫
(0,∞)
(y ∧ 1) ν(dy) <∞ . (47)
In addition, denote
ρ ≡ EJ(1) = η′(0) = c+
∫
(0,∞)
yν(dy) = c+
∫ ∞
0
ν [(y,∞)] dy (48)
and assume that ρ ∈ (0,∞). Now, let κ ∈ (0,∞) be some constant and
assume that V (s) = κ − J(s) for every s ≥ 0. In addition, for every α ∈[
0, λ−1
)
and s ≥ 0, define Jα(s) ≡ J(s) + γλ1−λαs which is a subordinator
with a Le´vy measure ν, parameter cα ≡ c+ γq1−qα and exponent ηα(·). Then,
given α ∈ [0, λ−1) and x ∈ [0, κ], observe that
ESα(x) = E inf
{
s ≥ 0;J(s) ≥ κ− x− γλ
1− λαs
}
= E inf {s ≥ 0;Jα(s) ≥ κ− x} .
To derive a formula that can be used in practice, it is well known (see e.g.,
Section 3.1 of [1]) that
Ee−τJ [Sα(x)] = ηα(τ)
∫ ∞
κ−x
e−τzUα(dz) , ∀τ ≥ 0 (49)
where Uα(·) is a potential measure which is defined via∫ ∞
0
e−τzUα(dz) =
1
ηα(τ)
, ∀τ ≥ 0 . (50)
By these equations, differentiating (49) w.r.t τ and taking τ ↓ 0 deduce that
EJ [Sα(x)] = η
′
α(0)
∫ κ−x
0
Uα(dz) . (51)
Thus, by plugging this result into Equation 3.7 of [6], deduce that
ESα(x) =
EJ [Sα(x)]
η′α(0)
=
∫ κ−x
0
Uα(dz) . (52)
This formula especially holds for x = 0 and hence it can be used as part of
a bisection procedure in order to derive α′ (see Remark 1). Notice that just
like described in the previous example, practically the user approximates
19
α′ from below and hence the resulting approximation of α′ is smaller than
λ−1. In addition, since V (0) is obviously P -a.s. bounded by κ, for every
α ∈ [0, α′]∩ [0, λ−1), this formula can be used as part of a bisection method
on [0, κ] in order to derive xα (see Remark 2). Then, it is left to to develop
a formula for g(α). To this end, let Sα = Sα (xα) and notice that
EJ2 (Sα) = 2η
′
α(0)
∫ κ−xα
0
zUα(dz) − η′′α(0)
∫ κ−xα
0
Uα(dz) (53)
can be derived by a similar fashion to (51). In addition, for every τ ≥ 0,
the Kella-Whitt martingale (see Theorem 2 of [23]) which is associated with
Jα(·) is given by
Mα(s; τ) ≡ −ηα(τ)
∫ s
0
e−τJα(s)ds+ 1− e−τJα(s) , ∀s ≥ 0 . (54)
Thus, by applying Doob’s optional stopping theorem w.r.t Sα ∧ s for some
s > 0 and then taking s → ∞ using monotone and bounded convergence
theorems, deduce that
E
∫ Sα
0
e−τJα(s)ds =
Ee−τJα(Sα) − 1
ηα(τ)
, ∀τ > 0 . (55)
Now, by differentiating both sides w.r.t τ , for every τ > 0 obtain
E
∫ Sα
0
Jα(s)e
−τJα(s)ds =
ηα(τ)EJα(Sα)e
−τJα(Sα) − η′α(τ)
[
Ee−τJα(Sα) − 1]
η2α(τ)
.
(56)
Thus, by taking a limit τ ↓ 0 using monotone convergence with the help of
l’Hopital’s rule (twice) deduce that
E
∫ Sα
0
Jα(s)ds =
η′′α(0)EJα(Sα)− η′α(0)EJ2α(Sα)
2 [η′α(0)]
2 . (57)
Now, observe that this result can be plugged into the objective function of
Phase II, i.e.,
g(α) = E
∫ Sα
0
[κ− Jα(s)] ds (58)
= κα− η
′′
α(0)EJα(Sα)− η′α(0)EJ2α(Sα)
2 [η′α(0)]
2 .
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Finally, derivation of α∗ which corresponds to (at least) an ǫ-optimal is done
by a line search on [0, α′] ∩ [0, λ−1) (see Remark 3).
Note that it has been shown that g(α) is phrased in terms of integrals
with respect to Uα(·). Thus, the rest of this subsection refer to a special case
for which the relevant expressions for the numerical procedure are expressed
by closed forms.
Remark 9 Importantly, observe that (57) holds also if Jα (and ηα) is re-
placed by a general subordinator (with the corresponding exponent). This
fact will be used in the next example.
4.2.1 A positive constant minus a Poisson process
Assume that J(·) is a Poisson process with rate q ∈ (0,∞). Now, let α ∈[
0, λ−1
)
, x ∈ [0, κ] and for every j = 0, 1, . . . , ⌊κ− x⌋ let
sj ≡ (1− λα)(κ − x− j)
λγ
(59)
and s⌊κ−x⌋+1 ≡ 0. In particular, notice that
κ− x− γλ
1− λαsj = j , ∀j = 0, 1, . . . , ⌊κ− x⌋ (60)
and for every s ≥ 0 define
δ(s) ≡ ⌊k − x− γλ
1− λαs⌋ . (61)
Then, observe that for every x ∈ [0, κ] and s ∈ [0,∞)\{s0, s1, . . . , s⌊k−x⌋+1}
P [Sα(x) > s] = P
[
J(s) < k − x− γλ
1− λαs
]
(62)
= 1[0,∞)
(
k − x− γλ
1− λαs
) δ(s)∑
n=0
e−qs
(qs)n
n!
(63)
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Thus,
ESα(x) =
∫ ∞
0
1[0,∞)
(
k − x− γλ
1− λαs
) δ(s)∑
n=0
e−qs
(qs)n
n!
ds (64)
= q−1
⌊κ−x⌋∑
j=0
j∑
n=0
∫ sj
sj+1
e−qs
qn+1sn
n!
ds
=
⌊κ−x⌋∑
j=0
j∑
n=0
n∑
m=0
qm−1
m!
(
e−qsj+1smj+1 − e−qsjsmj
)
is a formula that can be used in order to find α′ and xα for every α ∈ [0, α′].
In a similar fashion, for every α ∈ [0, α′] and s ≥ 0
P
(
S2α > s
)
= P
[
Sα(xα) >
√
s
]
(65)
and hence
ES2α =
∫ ∞
0
P
[
Sα(xα) >
√
s
]
ds (66)
=
⌊k−xα⌋∑
j=0
j∑
n=0
∫ sj
sj+1
e−q
√
s q
n (
√
s)
n
n!
ds (67)
=
⌊k−xα⌋∑
j=0
j∑
n=0
2(n + 1)
q2
∫ √sj
√
sj+1
e−qy
qn+2yn+1
(n+ 1)!
dy (68)
=
⌊k−xα⌋∑
j=0
j∑
n=0
2(n + 1)
n+1∑
m=0
qm−2
m!
(
e−q
√
sj+1s
m
2
j+1 − e−q
√
sjs
m
2
j
)
. (69)
Therefore, since Sα is square integrable (see Lemma 3), then to evaluate the
objective function of Phase II numerically, one may use (25) with (57) (see
also Remark 9) which implies that
g(α) = κα− E
∫ Sα
0
J(s)ds − γ λES
2
α
2 (1− λα)2 (70)
= κα− EJ
2(Sα)− EJ(Sα)
2q
− γ λES
2
α
2 (1− λα)2 .
Now, observe that J(Sα) is a discrete random variable with support N ≡
{0, 1, . . . , ⌊κ− xα⌋+ 1}. Thus, since J(·) maintains independent increments,
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then for every n ∈ N
P [J(Sα) = n] = P [J(sn) = n] (71)
+
n−1∑
i=0
P [J(sn) = i]P [J(sn)− J(sn−1) ≥ n− i] .
Finally, note that J(sn) ∼ Poi (qsn) and J(sn) − J(sn−1) ∼ Poi
(
q 1−λα
γλ
)
.
Therefore, all of these probabilities have closed form expressions and so are
EJ(Sα) and EJ
2(Sα).
4.3 A nonincreasing Markov modulated fluid flow
In this subsection, the assumption is that V (·) is a nonincreasing Markov
modulated fluid flow (MMFF). More precisely, let {J(t); t ≥ 0} be a continuous-
time Markov chain on a finite state-space {1, 2, . . . , n} with a generator
Q = [Qij] and an initial state probability vector η = (η1, . . . , ηn)
T . In addi-
tion, let κ ∈ (0,∞) and u1, . . . , un > 0 which are all constant parameters of
the model and define
V (s) ≡ κ−
∫ s
0
uJ(t)dt , ∀s ≥ 0 . (72)
Similarly, for every α ∈ [0, λ−1) and s ≥ 0 define
Vα(s) ≡ V (s)− γλ
1− λαs = κ−
∫ s
0
uαJ(t)dt (73)
such that
uαi = ui +
γλ
1− λα , ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n .
Clearly, Vα(·) is also a MMFF with the same modulating process J(·) and
an initial level κ but with other rates uα1 , u
α
2 , . . . , u
α
n replacing u1, u2, . . . , un.
Now, for fixed α ∈ [0, λ−1) and x ∈ [0, κ], notice that
ESα(x) = E inf
{
s ≥ 0;
∫ s
0
uαJ(t)dt = κ− x
}
(74)
is the expected time to buffer overflow calculated in Section 6 of [2]. Es-
pecially, this calculation can be carried out in order to derive ESα(0) for
every α ∈ [0, α′] ∩ [0, λ−1). Thus, using a bisection procedure α′ is derived
(see Remark 1). Moreover, the calculation provided by Section 6 of [2] can
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be used by the bisection method in order to derive xα ∈ [0, κ] for every
α ∈ [0, λ−1) (see Remark 2). Now, to compute g(α), notice that
g(α) = E
∫ Sα
0
Vα(s)ds = xαα+ E
∫ Sα
0
Vˆα(s)ds (75)
such that Vˆα(s) ≡ Vα(s)−xα,∀s ≥ 0. Therefore, since Vˆα(·) is also a MMFF
and
Sα = inf {s ≥ 0;Vα(s) = xα} = inf
{
s ≥ 0; Vˆα(s) = 0
}
, (76)
then E
∫ Sα
0 Vˆα(s)ds is a special case of the expectation derived in Equations
(4.7) and (4.8) of [4] with a discount factor β = 0 (this factor is defined
in this reference). Therefore, g(α) can be numerically evaluated for every
α ∈ [0, α′] ∩ [0, λ−1) which means that the corresponding line-search leads
to (at least) an ǫ-optimal solution of (7) (see Remark 3).
5 An internalization of externalities
[20] suggested to measure the externalities which are created by a customer
with a service demand of s ≥ 0 minutes in a stable M/G/1 system with
non-preemptive, work-conserving and strong discipline by the following way:
Assume that the system is in a steady-state and there is a tagged customer
with a service demand of s ≥ 0 minutes. Then, the externalities created by
the tagged customer is the total amount of waiting time that could be saved
by other customers if the tagged customer gave up on her service demand.
Observe that this is a nonnegative random variable which is associated with
an interpretation of the damage (in terms of waiting time) which is inflicted
on the society due to the service requirement of the tagged customer. The-
orem 2.1 of [20] states that once S is a random variable which is distributed
like a service time in this M/G/1 system, then the corresponding expected
externalities (as a function of s) is given by
s
λ2E (S)2
2 (1− λES)2 + s
2 λ
2 (1− λES) . (77)
Generally speaking, an internalization of externalities is an economic phe-
nomenon in which an inefficiency of a shared-resource system can be cor-
rected by an implementation of a price function such that every customer
pays for the expected social damage which is generated by her consumption.
Economic models in which this phenomenon occurs are surveyed in Subsec-
tion 1.1. In queueing systems, recently [28] has shown that this phenomenon
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takes place in certain queueing model (for a description of this model see
Subsection 1.1). In this section the purpose is to show that this economic
phenomenon also takes place in the system which was described in Section 2.
In particular, the following Theorem 2 states (under some regularity condi-
tions) that there is an optimal price function such that every customer pays
the expected damage she inflicts on others by her service requirement when
others are acting according to their individual optimizations. In particular,
since the assumptions of this model are different than those of [28], then
the proof here takes an absolutely different course. In particular, the proof
in this paper is heavily relied on the results of Section 3 and especially on
Theorem 1.
The following Lemma 6 is useful in order to prove the main result of this
section which is stated by the following Theorem 2.
Lemma 6 Let v : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) be a nonincreasing right-continuous func-
tion and for every n ≥ 1 define vn(s) ≡ v ∗ gn(s),∀s ≥ 0 such that
gn(u) ≡ n1[0, 1n ](−u) , ∀u ∈ R . (78)
Then,
1. For every n ≥ 1, vn(·) is a continuous, nonnegative and nonincreasing
function on [0,∞) such that 0 ≤ vn(0) ≤ v(0).
2. For every s ∈ [0,∞), vn(s) ↑ v(s) as n→∞.
Proof:
1. Let U be a random variable which is distributed uniformly on [0, 1]
and for every n ≥ 1 denote Un ≡ Un . Now, fix n ≥ 1 and notice that
vn(s) = Ev (s+ Un) , ∀s ≥ 0 . (79)
Recall that v(·) is nonnegative and nonincreasing function and hence
vn(·) also shares these properties. In addition, since Un is nonnegative,
then vn(0) ≤ v(0). To show that vn(·) is continuous on [0,∞), pick an
arbitrary s ∈ [0,∞) and let (sk)∞k=1 be a sequence such that sk → s
as k → ∞. Then, since v(·) is nonincreasing, then s − Un is P -a.s. a
continuity point of v(·), i.e., v (sk + Un)→ v (s+ Un) as k →∞ when
convergence holds P -a.s. In addition, 0 ≤ v (sk + Un) ≤ v(0) <∞ for
every k ≥ 1 and hence dominated convergence theorem implies that
lim
k→∞
vn(sk) = E lim
k→∞
v (sk + Un) = Ev (s+ Un) = vn(s) (80)
and the result follows.
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2. Fix s ∈ [0,∞) and observe that v(·) is nonnegative, nonincreasing and
right-continuous. Thus, since Un ↓ 0, P -a.s. as n→∞, then the result
follows by monotone convergence theorem.
Now, recall that once (7) has an optimal solution, then there exits α ∈[
0, λ−1
)
and xα ≥ 0 for which Sα = Sα (xα) is an optimal solution of (7).
Therefore, V (Sα) ≥ 0 and hence without loss of generality from now on in
this section assume that V (·) is nonnegative because otherwise the optimiza-
tion could be carried out with V +(·) instead of V (·) and the same optimum
would be derived.
Theorem 2 Assume that EV (0)
γ
< 1 and f(S∗) > 0. Then, there exists
(α, x) ∈ (0, λ−1)× [0,∞), such that
S′ ≡ inf
{
s ≥ 0;V (s)− γλ
1− λαs ≤ x
}
is a solution of (7) for which ES′ = α and
x =
γλ2E (S′)2
2 (1− λS′)2 . (81)
From this theorem and from Remark 7, it is straightforward to derive the
next Corollary 1 which makes a relation to (77). In particular, observe
that
∫ s
0 ξ(t)dt is the (deterministic) loss which is inflicted on the server by
a service requirement of s ≥ 0 minutes of the tagged customer.
Corollary 1 With the same assumptions and notations of Theorem 2, for
every constant π (and especially for π = 0)
p(s;π) = π + γ
[
s
λ2E (S′)2
2 (1− λES′)2 + s
2 λ
2 (1− λES′)
]
+
∫ s
0
ξ(t)dt , ∀s ≥ 0
is an optimal price function which corresponds to S′.
Next, there is a proof for Theorem 2.
Proof: This proof has two steps.
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Step 1:
Assume that V (·) is a continuous process and observe that the pre-conditions
of Theorem 1 hold because EV (0)
γ
< 1 (see Proposition 2). Then, let S∗, α∗
and x∗ be defined like in Theorem 1. Thus, since V (·) is a continuous
process, once S∗ > 0, then
V (S∗) =
γλ
1− λα∗S
∗ + x∗ .
Therefore, by multiplying both sides by S∗ and taking expectations deduce
that
ES∗V (S∗) =
γλ
1− λα∗E (S
∗)2 + x∗ES∗ =
γλ
1− λα∗E (S
∗)2 + x∗α∗ . (82)
In addition, for every v > 0 define a function ψ(v) ≡ f (vS∗). Now, for
every v > 0, since S∗ is square-integrable, then so is vS∗ and hence using
(25) deduce that
ψ(v) = E
∫ vS∗
0
V (s)ds − γλv
2E (S∗)2
2 (1− λvα∗) . (83)
Now, V (·) is continuous on [0,∞) and hence the fundamental theorem of
calculus implies that for every v > 0
d
dv
∫ vS∗
0
V (s)ds = S∗V (vS∗) .
Observe that this derivative is nonnegative and dominated from above by
S∗V (0). Therefore, since S∗ is dominated by a linear function of V (0) (see
Lemma 2) and EV 2(0) < ∞, then by dominated convergence theorem it is
possible to replace the order of expectation and differentiation, i.e., ψ(·) is
differentiable at some neighbourhood of v = 1 with a derivative
dψ(v)
dv
∣∣∣∣
v=1
= ES∗V (S∗)−
[
γλE (S∗)2
(1− λα∗) +
λ2γα∗E (S∗)2
2 (1− λα∗)2
]
.
Clearly, from Theorem 1, deduce that v = 1 is a global maximum of ψ(·).
Therefore, applying this result with a first order condition at v = 1 and an
insertion of (82) all together lead to a conclusion that
0 =
dψ(v)
dv
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= α∗
[
x∗ − γλ
2E (S∗)2
2 (1− λα∗)2
]
.
Note that f (S∗) > 0 implies that α∗ > 0 and hence the result follows.
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Step 2:
This step is a generalization of the proof from Step 1 for the case when
V (·) might be a discontinuous process. To this end, for every n ≥ 1 define
Vn(s) ≡ V ∗gn(s),∀s ≥ 0 such that gn is given by the statement of Lemma 6.
Note that due to this Lemma, for each n ≥ 1, Vn satisfies the assumptions
of Step 1 of this proof. In addition, by the same lemma, since it is known
that for every s ≥ 0, Vn(s) ↑ V (s) as n→∞. Now, for every n ≥ 1 consider
the optimization
max
S∈F
: E
∫ S
0
[
Vn(s)− s γλ
1− λES
]
ds
s.t: 0 ≤ S , P -a.s. ,
ES < λ−1 .
(84)
and denote its objective functional by fn(·). In addition, since Vn(0) ≤ V (0)
and EV (0)
γ
< 1, then Proposition 2 implies that (84) has a solution Sn which
is specified by Theorem 1. In particular, for every n ≥ 1 let αn ≡ ESn and
x1, x2, . . . be a sequence of numbers such that
Sn = inf
{
s ≥ 0;Vn(s)− λγ
1− λαn s ≤ xn
}
, ∀n ≥ 1 . (85)
Clearly, the sequence ES1, ES2, . . . is bounded on
[
0, λ−1
)
. In addition, re-
call that for every n ≥ 1, Sn is bounded by a linear function of Vn(0) which is
bounded by V (0) (see also Lemma 2). Therefore, since EV 2(0) <∞, the se-
quence ES21 , ES
2
2 , . . . is bounded. Consequently, an application of Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem implies that there exists {n(k)}∞k=1 ⊆ {1, 2, . . .} such
that
∃ lim
k→∞
ESn(k) ≡ α , ∃ lim
k→∞
ES2n(k) ≡ σ . (86)
Now, since for every k ≥ 1, Vn(k)(·) is a process which satisfies the assump-
tions of Step 1, deduce that
xn(k) = γ
λ2ES2
n(k)
2
(
1− λESn(k)
)2 , ∀k ≥ 1 s.t. αn(k) > 0 . (87)
Now, assume by contradiction that there exists {kl}∞l=1 ⊆ {1, 2, . . .} such
that αn(kl) = 0 for every l ≥ 1. This implies that Sn(kl) = 0, P -a.s. for every
l ≥ 1. Therefore, by optimality of Sn(kl) for each l ≥ 1 deduce that
fn(kl) (S
∗) ≤ fn(kl)
(
Sn(kl)
)
= 0 , ∀l ≥ 1 . (88)
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Moreover, by Theorem 1 S∗ is square-integrable and hence it is fine use (25).
Thus, since for every s ≥ 0, 0 ≤ Vn(kl)(s) ↑ V (s) as l →∞, then monotone
convergence implies that
fn(kl) (S
∗) = E
∫ S∗
0
Vn(kl)(s)ds −
γλ
2 (1− λα∗)E (S
∗)2 (89)
−−−→
l→∞
E
∫ S∗
0
V (s)ds− γλ
2 (1− λα∗)E (S
∗)2 = f (S∗)
and hence f (S∗) ≤ 0 which is a contradiction. This implies that there exists
{kl}∞l=1 ⊆ {1, 2, . . .} such that αn(kl) > 0 for every l ≥ 1. Therefore, for this
subsequence (86) implies that
∃ lim
l→∞
xn(kl) = γ
λ2σ
2 (1− λα)2 ≡ x . (90)
Moreover, by construction, for every s ≥ 0, Vn(kl)(s) ↑ V (s) as l → ∞ and
observe that αn(kl) → α as l→∞. Therefore, if for every l ≥ 1
Hl(s) ≡ xn(kl) +
γλ
1− λαn(kl)
s− Vn(kl)(s) , ∀s ≥ 0 (91)
and similarly
H(s) ≡ x+ γλ
1− λαs− V (s) , ∀s ≥ 0 (92)
then for every s ≥ 0, Hl(s)→ H(s) as l→∞. Now, for every l ≥ 1 define
H−1l (u) ≡ inf {s ≥ 0;Hl(s) ≥ u} , ∀u ∈ R (93)
and similarly
H−1(u) ≡ inf {s ≥ 0;H(s) ≥ u} , ∀u ∈ R . (94)
Especially, observe that since H(·),H1(·),H2(·), . . . are all (strictly) increas-
ing processes tending to infinity as s→∞ and henceH−1(·),H−11 (·),H−12 (·), . . .
are finite-valued continuous processes (with a time index u). Now, using ex-
actly the same arguments which were made in the proof of Theorem 2A
of [29] deduce that for every u ∈ R, H−1l (u) → H−1(u) as l → ∞. In
particular, this is true for u = 0, i.e., for every sample-space realization
lim
l→∞
Sn(kl) = inf
{
s ≥ 0;V (s)− λγ
1− λαs ≤ x
}
≡ S′ (95)
29
holds and the purpose now is to show that (1) ES′ = α and (2) S′ is a
solution of (7). To this end, notice that for every l ≥ 1, Sn(kl) is nonnegative
and bounded from above by a linear function of Vn(0) which is bounded by
V (0). Therefore, dominated convergence implies that
α = ES′ , σ = E
(
S′
)2
. (96)
Now, for every l ≥ 1, Vn(kl)(s) ≤ V (s),∀s ≥ 0 and hence fn(kl)(S) ≤
f(S),∀S ∈ S. Thus, the optimality of Sn(kl) for each l ≥ 1 implies that
fn(kl) (S
∗) ≤ fn(kl)
(
Sn(kl)
) ≤ f (Sn(kl)) ≤ f (S∗) , ∀l ≥ 1 . (97)
Moreover, by Theorem 1, it is known that S∗ is square-integrable and hence
it is possible to use (25). Thus, since for every s ≥ 0, 0 ≤ Vn(s) ↑ V (s),
monotone convergence implies that
fn(kl) (S
∗) = E
∫ S∗
0
Vn(kl)(s)ds−
γλ
2 (1− λα∗)E (S
∗)2 (98)
−−−→
l→∞
E
∫ S∗
0
V (s)ds − γλ
2 (1− λα∗)E (S
∗)2 = f (S∗) .
Therefore, since Theorem 1 states also that ES2
n(kl)
<∞,∀l ≥ 1 it is fine to
use (25) once again with a squeezing theorem in order to deduce that
f (S∗) = lim
l→∞
f
(
Sn(kl)
)
(99)
= lim
l→∞
E
∫ S
n(kl)
0
V (s)− γλ liml→∞E
(
Sn(kl)
)2
2
(
1− λ liml→∞ αn(kl)
)
= E
∫ S′
0
V (s)ds − γλE (S
′)2
2 (1− λES′) = f
(
S′
)
.
In particular, notice that for every l ≥ 1, Sn(kl) is bounded from above by
a linear function of V (0). Hence, for every l ≥ 1, ∫ Sn(kl)0 V (s)ds is bounded
from above by V
2(0)
γλ
which is square-integrable. Thus, dominated conver-
gence theorem justifies the third equality of (99) and the result follows.
Remark 10 Observe that the assumption EV (0)
γ
< 1 is required only for
Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 2. For the proof of Step 1, it is enough to
assume that (7) has a solution.
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6 A retrial version of the model
Consider the following model of a retrial queue which is similar to the model
described in Section 2. Assume that customers arrive into a service facility
with a single server, no waiting room and an infinite orbit capacity according
to a Poisson process with rate λ ∈ (0,∞). In addition, the retrial times
constitute an iid sequence of exponentially distributed random variables
with rate θ ∈ (0,∞) which is independent of all other random objects in this
model. Another assumption is that the service discipline is non-preemptive
such that when a customer enters into a service position, she receives service
which lasts until she decides to stop and then leaves the system for good.
To model the preferences of the customers, let
(X(·), C,D) , (X1(·), C1,D1) , (X2(·), C2,D2) , . . . (100)
be an iid sequence of random objects which is independent from the arrival
process. In particular, C and D are nonnegative random variables with
positive finite means EC = γ and ED = δ. Furthermore, the assumption is
that {X(s); s ≥ 0} is a process like described in Section 2. Now, for every
i ≥ 1, the total utility of the i’th customer from waiting w ≥ 0 minutes (not
including service time), conducting r retrials and receiving a service of s ≥ 0
minutes is given by
Ui (s,w, r; p) ≡ Xi(s)− p(s)− Ciw −Dir (101)
where p : [0,∞]→ [−∞,∞] is a general Bore´l function. This means that the
i’th customer suffers a constant loss of Di monetary units per each retrial,
linear loss from waiting time with rate Ci and she also has a stochastic
marginal utility from service duration which is given by Xi(·). In addition,
the assumptions regarding the revenue structure of the server are identical
to those made in Section 2. Also, let ξ(·) and V (·) be the same process
which is defined in Section 2. In particular, the assumptions regarding the
revenue structure of the server are identical to those made in Section 2.
Now, the purpose here is to find an optimal price function when opti-
mality is defined in the same sense of Section 2. To this end, using known
results regarding M/G/1 retrial queue with exponential retrial times (see
e.g., Equations (3.15) and (3.16) of [33]) , to derive an optimal service dis-
tribution, the optimization to be solved is given by
max
S∈S
: E
∫ S
0
V (s)ds − (γ + θδ)λ
[
ES2
2 (1− λES) +
ES
θ (1− λES)
]
. (102)
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Especially, notice that just like in Section 3 the objective functional of (102)
is not well-defined for any random variable S for which ES2 = E
∫ S
0 V (s)ds =
∞. Therefore, the problem can be rephrased as follows
max
S∈S
: E
∫ S
0
[
V (s)− sλ (γ + θδ)
1− λES
]
ds− λ (γ + θδ)ES
θ (1− λES) (103)
and let f˜(·) be the objective functional of (104). Now, consider the same
two-phase solution strategy which was used Section 3.
6.1 Phase I:
For every α ∈ [0, λ−1) the optimization of Phase I is
max
S∈F
: E
∫ S
0
[
V (s)− λ (γ + θδ)
1− λα s
]
ds
s.t: 0 ≤ S , P -a.s. ,
ES = α .
(104)
This optimization is identical to (11) up to re-parametrization of γ and hence
the same results hold for this case. In particular, there exists xα such that
S˜α ≡ inf
{
s ≥ 0;V (s)− λ (γ + θδ)
1− λα s ≤ xα
}
(105)
is an optimal solution of (104).
6.2 Phase II:
For every α ∈ [0, λ−1) denote the objective value of Phase II:
g˜(α) ≡ f˜
(
S˜α
)
(106)
= E
∫ S˜α
0
[
V (s)− sλ (γ + θδ)
1− λα
]
ds− λ (γ + θδ)α
θ (1− λα) .
Now, the same kind of analysis which was performed in Subsection 3.2 im-
plies similar result in the current setup. In particular, there is an analogue
for Theorem 1 which is given by
Theorem 3 Assume that (7) has an optimal solution. Then,
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1. There exists α∗ ∈
[
0, EV (0)(γ+θδ)λ
]
∩ [0, λ−1) such that S˜∗ ≡ S˜α∗ (x∗) is an
optimal solution of (104) which has a finite second moment.
2. For every constant π, an optimal price function is given by
p˜∗(s) ≡ π + sx∗ + s2 λ (γ + θδ)
2 (1− λα∗) +
∫ s
0
ξ(t)dt , ∀s ≥ 0 . (107)
Moreover, it is of a special importance to notice that the parameters of p˜∗(·)
can be derived using the techniques which were developed in Section 3 and
illustrated in Section 4.
6.3 Conjecture about externalities in M/G/1 retrial queue
The purpose of this part is to discuss externalities in M/G/1 retrial queue
with no waiting room, infinite orbit capacity and exponential retrial times
with a constant rate (for exact model setup see e.g., Sections 2 and 3 of [33]).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no academic discussion regarding this
topic and especially there are no existing results for expected externalities in
this setup. To begin with, notice that unlike the regular M/G/1 queue, in a
retrial queue the externalities created by a tagged customer are decomposed
into two parts:
1. Waiting externalities: The total waiting time that could be saved for
customers if the tagged customer gave up on her service requirement.
2. Retrial externalities: The number of retrials that could be saved for
customers if the tagged customer gave up on her service requirement.
Now, assume that (104) has a solution, f˜
(
S˜∗
)
> 0 and V (·) is a continuous
process. Then,
ES˜∗V
(
S˜∗
)
= x∗α∗ +
λ (γ + θδ)
1− λα E
(
S˜∗
)2
. (108)
and for every v > 0 define
ψ˜(v) ≡ f˜
(
vS˜∗
)
= E
∫ vS˜∗
0
V (s)ds− (γ + θδ)λ

 v2E
(
S˜∗
)2
2
(
1− λvES˜∗
) + vES˜∗
θ
(
1− λvES˜∗
)

 .
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Now, v = 1 is a maximum point of ψ˜(·). Moreover, by the same arguments
presented in Step 1 of Theorem 2 deduce that ψ˜(·) is differentiable at a
neighbourhood of v = 1. Therefore, the corresponding first order condition
with an insertion of (108) implies that
x∗ =
λ (γ + θδ)
(1− λα∗)2
[
λE
(
S˜∗
)2
+ θ−1
]
. (109)
Remark 11 Note that the same technique which was used to generalize the
result of step 1 of the proof of Theorem 2 can be used here as well in order
to generalize this result to the case where V (·) is not necessarily continuous.
Now, by an insertion of (109) into (107) deduce that when (104) has a
solution, then for every s ≥ 0
p˜∗(s) = λ (γ + θδ) z(s) +
∫ s
0
ξ(t)dt (110)
such that
z(s) = s
λE
(
S˜∗
)2
+ θ−1
(1− λα∗)2 + s
2 λ
2 (1− λα∗) . (111)
6.3.1 Conjecture about expected externalities
Therefore, if p˜∗(·) internalizes the externalities in this model (just like p∗(·)
does in an analogue model), then by recalling the roles of γ and δ deduce that
the mean waiting and retrial externalities which are caused due to a tagged
customer with a service demand of s ≥ 0 minutes are given respectively by
λz(s) and λθz(s). Since this is not the focus of this work, the proof of this
conjecture is left for future research.
7 Discussion
This part is dedicated for a discussion about a version of the model presented
in Section 2 in which customers may refuse joining the queue. As to be
shown, this perturbation in the model assumptions makes no conceptual
difference albeit there is still some room for future research regarding this
version of the model. Namely, assume that
(Θ, J(·)) , (Θ1, J1(·)) , (Θ2, J2(·)) , . . . (112)
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is an iid sequence of random objects such that C which is defined in Section
2 is a constant γ ∈ (0,∞), Θ is a nonnegative square-integrable random
variable and J(·) is nondecreasing right-continuous process such that J(0) =
0. Now, consider the model of Section 2 such that for every i ≥ 1
Xi(s) ≡ Θi − Ji(s) , ∀s ≥ 0 (113)
and X(s) ≡ Θ − J(s),∀s ≥ 0. In particular, observe that X(·) is nonin-
creasing right-continuous stochastic process such that X(0) is a nonnegative
square-integrable random variable. Then, the assumption is that for every
i ≥ 1 the information set of the i’th customer is the sigma-field which is
generated by Θi. In addition, the queue is unobservable and every cus-
tomer has to decide whether to join it or not. Now, customers decisions are
determined respectively by their information sets which are independent.
Therefore, since Θ1,Θ2, . . . is an iid sequence which is independent from the
arrival process, so is the sequence of customers decisions. Now, consider a
customer who joins the queue. Then, once she is in the queue, she can’t
influence on her waiting time by any decision making. From that point of
view, this system is the same like the original one which was described in
Section 2. i.e., eventually the model under consideration in this section is
a regular M/G/1 queue with a service distribution which is determined en-
dogenously by the choice of a price function through the mechanism of an
individual optimization. Observe that unlike the original model presented
in Section 2, now every individual optimization includes an additional step
concerning the join or not to join dilemma. Allegedly, as done in previous
works (see [12, 28, 32]) the next step should be an analysis of the interac-
tions between customers and the corresponding equilibrium behavior. An
alternative approach is based on the previous results of this work and re-
quires no understanding of the strategic interaction between the customers.
Recall that in Section 3 the task was to solve the problem of optimizing the
performance measure over all service distributions for which the resulting
M/G/1 system is stable (including those with an atom in zero). Thus, the
key observation is to notice that this optimization is also valid for the cur-
rent version of the model. Therefore, it is left to find a price function for
which the individual optimization adapted to the new setup has a unique
solution which has this optimal service distribution. Now, recall that Theo-
rem 1 specifies an optimal service distribution with a corresponding random
variable
S∗ = inf
{
s ≥ 0;V (s)− γλ
1− λα∗ s ≤ xα∗
}
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for some α∗ ∈ [0, λ−1) and xα∗ ≥ 0. This actually means that an optimal
screening policy of a social planner is to reject all customers for whom
Θi = X(0) = V (0) ≤ xα∗ .
With respect to this understanding, consider a price function
p∗(s;π) = π + sxα∗ + s2
γλ
2 (1− λα∗) +
∫ s
0
ξ(t)dt , ∀s ≥ 0 (114)
for which π is a constant which is determined such that the only customers
who join the queue are those who have types which are greater than xα∗ .
To make this solution work, an additional assumption is needed. Namely,
assume that Θ and J(·) are independent (it is possible to weaken a bit this
assumption but for simplicity consider this stronger assumption). With this
assumption it can be verified that for every i ≥ 1, the expected utility of
the i’th customer conditioned by her type is nondecreasing w.r.t her type.
Therefore, it is enough to determine π for which a customer with a type of
xα∗ is indifferent regarding the dilemma of joining the queue. This means,
that π is determined as a solution of
Ep (S∗;π)
∣∣ {Θ = xα∗} = E
∫ S∗
0
[
X(s)− γλ
1− λα∗ s
]
ds
∣∣∣∣ {Θ = xα∗} (115)
which is
π = −
[
E
∫ S∗
0
[J(s) + ξ(s)] ds+ γ
λE (S∗)2
1− λα∗
]
. (116)
In particular, this shows that with the above-mentioned assumptions π
which implies social optimality is nonpositive. By the way, this is intriguing
to think whether there are some other queueing models with strategic inter-
actions between agents which can be solved by such a two-stage approach,
that is without any analysis of the interactions between the customers.
Finally, the problem with this solution is the requirement of an addi-
tional independence assumption. An alternative approach is to develop a
mechanism which makes the customers to reveal their types. In practice,
with such a mechanism in hands it is possible to set a price function which is
suggested in Theorem 1 with π which is determined uniquely for every type
(and not just for the type xα∗) in a similar fashion to (116). Notice that in
such a case, the intercept of the price function is a random variable which is
determined by the type of the customer. Although it is very interesting and
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associated with a convincing motivation, the issue of development of such a
mechanism remains an open question for further research.
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